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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Violation of a Protective Order, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Judge, presiding.1 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Before a defendant may be convicted of violating a protective order, the State must 
show that the defendant was properly served with the order. Here, the State did not 
present sufficient evidence that Appellant Lavar T. Jensen was properly served. Is his 
1
 A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is attached in 
Addendum A. 
conviction for violating a protective order sustainable? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of both law and fact. The question of 
whether Mr. Jensen was served with a protective order is a question of fact that this Court 
reviews with deference to the trial court's ruling.2 However, whether the service was 
legally proper is a question of law reviewed for correctness.3 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 110 [84-98]. 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Under the United States Supreme Court case of Batson v. Kentucky and its 
jurisprudence, a prosecutor may not use a peremptory strike to dismiss a venire person on 
the basis of gender. In this case, the prosecutor removed two veniremen based on 
assumptions that she made about them because of their gender. Are these dismissals 
constitutional? 
Standard of Review: "The trial court's [threshold] conclusion as to whether or not a 
prima facie case [of sexual discrimination] was established is a legal determination which 
2
 See In re Schwenke. 865 P.2d 1350, 1354 (Utah 1993) ("Whether a person has been 
served with process is a question of fact."); Cooke v. Cooke. 2001 UT App 110, f 7, 22 P.3d 
1249 (question of whether husband was served with process in a divorce action is a question of 
fact). 
3
 See Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds v. Jordenelle Special Service DisU 2001 UT 
App 257, Tf7, 47 P.3d 86 ("Whether service of process is proper presents a question of law that 
we review for correctness."); Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 n.3 (Utah 1991) ("Although we 
have held that whether a person has been served with process is a question of fact.. . , whether a 
person is properly served is a question of law.") 
2 
[this Court] review[s] for correctness, according it no particular deference.' Any "factual 
findings of the trial court relevant to allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges 
merit deference on appeal and will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous." M, at 
459. Ultimately, the trial court's decision about whether purposeful discrimination was 
proved "turns on the credibility of the proponent of the strike and will not be set aside 
unless it is clearly erroneous."5 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 110 [31-34]. 
STATEMENT OF THE THIRD ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses 
against him and to present evidence material to his defense. In this case, the defense 
depended on the cross-examination and impeachment of the alleged victim. However, she 
did not appear at trial and the court denied the defense counsel's motion to continue. Was 
the denial an abuse of discretion? 
Standard of Review: The denial of a motion for a continuance is reviewed under the 
4
 State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454,459 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also Batson v. Kentucky. 
476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (describing the legal standards for assessing a prima facie case); State v. 
Span, 819 P.2d 329, 340-42 (Utah 1991) (analyzing the legal cognizability of a minority group 
for purposes of assessing a prima facie case of racial discrimination). 
5
 State v. Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). See also State v. Bowman, 945 
P.2d 153,155 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (The trial court's determination about whether purposeful 
racial discrimination has been proved "is a question of fact, [and] we will not reverse the 
decision of the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous.") 
3 
abuse of discretion standard.6 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 110 [42-61]. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
The following constitutional provisions are relevant on appeal: 
The Fifth Amendment to the United State Constitution, which provides, in 
pertinent part: 
nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of l a w . . . . 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides, in 
pertinent part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for 
his defence. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides, in 
pertinent part: 
. . . No State shal l . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
6
 Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Co-op, Inc.. 2002 UT 39, ^[16,48 P.3d 910; 
Price Dev. Co., L.P. v. Orem Citv. 2000 UT 26,1(9, 995 P.2d 1237; State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 
408, 413 (Utah 1993). 
4 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The following statutes are determinative on appeal: 
Section 30-6-4.2 of the Utah Code, "Protective Orders," which is provided in 
Addendum B. 
Section 76-5-108 of the Utah Code, "Violation of Protective Orders," which 
provides: 
1^  1 > Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective 
order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, 
Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, 
Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign 
protective order as described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or 
knowingly violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 
77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic 
violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in 
accordance with Section 77-36-1 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999). 
The following rules of evidence are relevant on appeal: 
Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which is provided in Addendum C. 
Rule 902 of ti :ie "I Jtah Ri il.es; of Ei ridei ice, w hicl I is pi ovided in Addendum D. 
S T A T E M E N T OF THE CASE 
(>«i fvlii\ ,? Si, I *>*>*> ,1 hearing oi i a petition for a protective order was held before 
Judge Wi l l i am W . Barrett of the Third District Court. R. i 12 [ i , <f j . ! :v^n» ler, 
5 
Jolynne Thomas, and the respondent, Mr. Jensen both attended the hearing. Id. at 1. Ms. 
Thomas was represented by counsel, but Mr. Jensen was not. Id, Judge Barrett granted 
the petition and issued a protective order. Id. at 1-4. 
The protective order consists of several pages of numbered paragraphs with blanks 
beside them.7 Some paragraphs are checked, and others are not. Id The checked 
paragraphs prohibit the "Respondent" from, among other things, abusing the "Petitioner," 
communicating with the "Petitioner," or visiting the "Petitioner's" home or workplace. 
Id. at 2. The document is signed by Judge Barrett and is stamped as "filed." Id at 1,4. On 
the last page, the following statement appears: 
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service[] of 
this Protective Order and waives the right to be personally served. 
Id at 5. This is followed by a cursive signature reading "Lavar Jensen," and an instruction 
to "Serve Respondent at: 6985 So. Pine Mt. Dr. 84121." Id There is no notary, witness 
signature, or certificate of delivery or service. 
More than two years later, on June 21, 2001, Mr. Jensen was charged with 
violating the protective order. R. 3-5. He pled not guilty to the charge. R. 10. A jury trial 
was scheduled for October 16, 2001, and a venire assembled on that date. R. 110 [3-4]. 
After voir dire, the prosecutor used all three of her peremptory strikes to eliminate 
men. R. 57-58. The defense counsel objected on the basis that the strikes appeared to be a 
pretext for sexual discrimination. R. 110 [31]. The trial court asked the prosecutor to 
7
 Id at 1-5. The protective order is attached as addendum E. 
6 
explain the strikes. Id. at 32. She replied: 
I didn't even initially realize that all three of them were men, all three of my 
challenges were men until [the defense counsel] pointed it out. / have on my 
notations that the three struck were part of the protective order, and 
logically I assumed that usually they would be on defendant's side, since 
more [] likely than not men are the respondents to protective orders, other 
than women. Those were my reasoning. I also struck - 1 don't have his 
name here - the first male, because he was an engineer, I - my reason 
being someone that - 1 would want someone that's less analytical. 
Id. (emphasis added). In response, the defense counsel argued that this explanation was 
inherently sexually discriminatory because the prosecutor had assumed that all men who 
indicated involvement with protective orders were perpetrators of violence. Id. at 33-34. 
Also, the prosecutor had assumed thai the women involved with protective orders were 
not.8 Because of this, the defense counsel argued, the strikes shoiild tlot be allowed. R. 
57-58, 110 [33-34]. 
The trial court disagreed and allowed the strikes. Id, at 34. Then the jury was 
impaneled. Id 
Before the examination of witnesses started, the defense counsel noticed that Ms. 
Thomas, the alleged victim, was not in the courtroom. IcL at 42. The defense counsel 
immediately made a motion loi a loiilnifiaiMV on the basis thai Ms Thomas' testimony 
was crucial to the defense. Id. at 42-43. The defense counsel explained that Ms. Thomas' 
testimony would show that Mr. Jensen did not know a protective order was in place: 
The i ' - as' testimoi ly] is that ii i 1999 she 
8
 During voir dire the venire persons had been asked whether they had ever been involved 
with a protective order, but they had not been asked how they had been involved. Id. at 23. 
7 
informed several people that she had the protective order dismissed. That is 
the crucial bit of evidence, because with that in mind the defendant had a 
reasonable basis to believe that the protective order had been dismissed, 
which would then be he had not committed any crime 
Id. at 52. The defense counsel also pointed out that Mr. Jensen had a constitutional right 
to present a defense and to confront Ms. Thomas, and that these rights were violated by 
her absence. Id at 43, 55, 57. 
The trial court asked the prosecutor whether Ms. Thomas had been subpoenaed. Id. 
at 48. The prosecutor answered that she had. IdL 
After listening to further argument from both sides, the trial court denied the 
defense counsel's motion for a continuance. Id at 58. The court also opined that the 
defense would not be impaired by Ms. Thomas' absence because the defense was not 
expected to discredit the statements of a witness who did not appear: 
[W]hat you have here is an attempt to impeach a witness, but there is no 
witness. It's impeaching someone who's not a witness. That's not 
accommodated by the rules 
IcL at 57-58. With that, the trial proceeded. 
After each side presented its case, the defense counsel made a motion for a 
directed verdict on the basis that the State had not shown that Mr. Jensen was properly 
served with the protective order. Id. at 84. A certified copy of the Protective Order had 
been entered into evidence, but the Order did not have an authenticated signature from 
Mr. Jensen or proof that he had been served. Id. 
The State responded that the signature of a "Lavar Jensen" appeared at the end of 
8 
the order, and that for prima facie purposes, this is enough. Id. at 91. 
The trial court agreed with the State. Id. at 92-93. The trial court opined that the 
protective order was a self-authenticating document under Rule 902 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and that it was sufficient for prima facie purposes. Id. at 93. 
The case was submitted to the jury and Mr. Jensen was convicted of violating a 
protective order. R. 79. He filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 98-99. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Jensen and Ms. Thomas began a romantic relationship in 1997. R. 110 [106]. 
Two years latei I\ Is I I ioi i las petitioned tl ic 1 .1 lii d [ )isti ict Coi u t for a protective order 
against Mr. Jensen. R. 112 [4]. The order was issued, and it prohibited Mr. Jensen from 
contacting Ms. Thomas or from visiting her residence or place of employment. Id. at 1-2. 
However, there is nothing to show • * * lonseti was ever properly served with the 
order. R. 112 [1-5]. 
After the order was issued, Mr. Jensen and Ms. Thomas continued their 
relationship j < . They even entertained their friends together. At Christmas, 
they held a party at Mr. Jensen's house. IdL at 107-08, 1 IU. During the part) , oi le of J\ lr. 
Jensen's friends, Brandon Monthey, pulled Mr. Jensen aside and expressed concern about 
Ms. Thomas' presence. IcL at 11n ^ lonthly told Mr. Jensen that he could "get in 
trouble if there was a pmt u ' ' : •.ind|Ms I IHHIM ,| \\ ,is ,it his house U\_ 
However, Ms. Thomas overheard the conversation and told Mr. Monthey not to worry 
9 
because the order "had been lifted." IdL 
Mr. Jensen's and Ms. Thomas' relationship continued for the next two years. Id. at 
114. Mr. Jensen's sister, Laurie Wagers, testified of this and cited some examples. Id. She 
testified that in December, 2000 or January, 2001 the couple went to the restaurant where 
Ms. Wagers worked. Id. The couple not only ate together, but held hands throughout the 
evening. Id, 
Similar testimony was given by Jeremy Johnson, Ms. Thomas' neighbor. Mr. 
Johnson moved into the duplex next to Ms. Thomas' house in March, 2001. Id at 82. He 
testified that Mr. Jensen visited Ms. Thomas several times and that they seemed to be 
dating. Id at 80. He even saw Mr. Jensen watering Ms. Thomas' back lawn and digging 
holes for her new sprinkling system. Id. at 81-82. 
Then, on May 29, 2001, Mr. Johnson was on his front porch having a cigarette. Id 
at 76. He saw Mr. Jensen arrive and knock on Ms. Thomas' door. Id at 77. Ms. Thomas 
did not answer, and so Mr. Jensen walked over to Mr. Johnson's porch and began 
chatting with him. Id at 78. A few minutes later, Ms. Thomas emerged from her house, 
got in her car, and drove away. Id. 
That same day, Ms. Thomas visited a nearby police station. Ld at 68. She appeared 
to be upset and reported that she had been involved in an "incident" with her boyfriend. 
Id. at 67. An officer searched the records to determine whether there was a protective 
order against Mr. Jensen. Id He found one in place. Id Mr. Jensen was charged with 
Violation of a Protection Order and arrested. R. 3-6. 
10 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The principal argument in this case is that Mr. Jensen's conviction should be 
reversed because the State did not make a prima facie showing that IVIt fensen was 
served with the protective order that he is accused of violating. A showing of proper 
service is essential to a conviction for violating a protective order, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-108(1) (1999), and without this showing, a conviction cannot stand. 
Proper service could have been shown by a certificate of i i lailii ig :>i deln ' ei ) , 1 Ital I 
R.Civ. 5 (2002), or by testimony from the server that service was completed. Utah R. 
Evid. 901(b)(1) (2002). Also, Mr. Jensen's signature on the document would have been 
sufficient if it was authenticated hv nolaiy, 1 Ikih R .KHI (>02( 1 n (2002), or In Ik 
testimony of a handwriting analyzer. Utah R.Evid. 901(b) (2) & (3) (2002). 
But the State submitted none of this evidence. Instead, it simply submitted the 
protective oi dei itself, wit! i ai i attached page showing a signature reading "Lavar Jensen." 
R. 112 [5]. This signature is not authenticated, and it could have been written by anybody. 
Also, there is nothing to show that Mr. Jensen received the order, read the order, or even 
saw I IK1 ordei, And there is nothing to show that the contents of the order were explained 
to him. 
In these circumstances, Mr. Jensen's conviction cannot be sustained and should be 
reversed on the grounds that the State failed to make the required prima facie showing of 
proper service. 
Alternatively, Mr. Jensen's conviction should be reversed and this case should be 
11 
remanded for a new trial. There are two bases for this: 1) the prosecutor sexually 
discriminated against two veniremen during the jury selection; and 2) the trial court 
effectively denied Mr. Jensen his constitutional rights by holding trial without a crucial 
witness. 
First, the prosecutor violated the holdings of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986) and its jurisprudence by sexually discriminating against two veniremen. These 
men, along with several other men and women, had indicated during voir dire that they 
had experienced some involvement with protective orders. R. 110 [24]. The trial court did 
not ask for details, and nobody knew whether these venire persons were petitioners, 
respondents, or witnesses in protective order cases. Id. However, during the jury 
selection, the prosecutor removed two men, explaining: "logically I assumed that usually 
they would be on defendant's side, since more [] likely than not men are the respondents 
to protective orders . . . . " R. 110 [32]. This demonstrates that the prosecutor applied a 
sexual stereotype in dismissing these two men, and this violates the equal protection 
clause of the federal constitution. And so, a reversal and retrial is necessary in this case. 
Second, the trial court's decision to hold trial without a crucial witness was an 
abuse of discretion. This witness, Ms. Thomas, was the alleged victim. Her testimony, 
and the impeachment of her expected statements, would have established that she told 
Mr. Jensen and several other people that the protective order had been dismissed. R. 110 
[52]. Also, it would have established that she continued her relationship with Mr. Jensen 
for two years after petitioning for a protective order against him. It would also show that 
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she had made conflicting statements to police officers about alleged assaults. Id. at 52-54. 
Ultimately, it would have established that Mr. Jensen did not knowingly or intentionally 
violate a protective order. The trial court's decision to hold trial without Ms. Thomas 
violated Mr. Jensen's right to due process and his right to confront the witnesses against 
him. So, Mr. Jensen's conviction should be reversed and this case remanded for a new 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. JENSEN'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE HE 
WAS NEVER PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE PROTECTIVE ORDER 
The crime of violating a protective order does not have much in common with 
other types of crimes. This is because other types of crimes are either inherently evil or 
commonly required for the operation of an orderly society.9 But the violation of a 
protective order is neither. Instead, it is disobedience to an individualized coi it i oiclei that 
prohibits actions which are otherwise perfectly legal. For example, it may prohibit a 
person from writing or telephoning another person, visiting that person's residence or 
place of emplo) i i lent. , oi c arryii lg a weapoi 1 I Jtah Code A,i in § 30-6 4 2 (Si lpp 2002) It 
may also impose guidelines on child visitation, the payment of child support, or the use of 
an automobile. Id. Without a protective order, all of these things are left to an individual's 
9
 In other words, most crimes are either malum in se ("evil in itself; something inherently 
and universally considered evil,") or malum prohibitum ("wrong merely because it is proscribed; 




Because a protective order imposes restrictions on normal actions, proper service 
of the order is critical. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108(1) (1999). After all, a person will not 
obey such an order if he does not know about it. Being served notifies him that the order 
has been issued by a judge and that it is legally binding. He can read the order and 
understand all of its provisions and prohibitions. He can note the addresses that he is 
ordered to avoid and avoid them. He can determine how long the order will stand. He can 
go to an attorney for advice. He can prepare a defense, ask for a modification, or counter-
petition. In short, he will not ignorantly commit a crime if he is given proper notice of the 
protective order. 
These practical considerations are reason enough for requiring service of a 
protective order. In fact, at least one jurisdiction has required service on this very basis.10 
But here in Utah, we have even more reasons for requiring proper service. Namely, we 
have two sets of laws, federal due process and Utah statutory law, that require service. 
The following two subsections thoroughly explore the issue of proper service. The 
first subsection examines the laws that require proper service, and the second lists the 
methods of proper service. Ultimately, both subsections will demonstrate that the State 
failed to make the required prima facie showing of proper service, and that Mr. Jensen's 
10
 See Small v. State. 809 S.W.2d 253,256-57 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (court reversed 
conviction where "there is no evidence in this record that the appellant agreed to a protective 
order, attended any hearing or in any way participated, that he was ever served with a copy of the 
protective order, or that he in any way received notice, formal or informal, of the issuance or 
existence of the court order in question prior to his coming into the [prohibited] home.") 
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conviction must be reversed. 
A. Proper Service is Necessary Under the Federal Due Process Provisions 
and the Applicable State Statutes 
Both the federal due process provisions and the applicable state statutes require 
proper service of protective orders. However, the due process provisions provide for a 
better understanding of the underlying principal for the service requirement, and so these 
provisions will be examined first. 
The reason that the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments apply to protective orders is because such orders deprive respondents of 
their freedoms of movement and association. These freedoms ai e protected i ights. U.S. 
Const, amend. V & XIV, § 1. They cannot be taken by the government unless the 
government follows specific procedures designed to promote fairness and justice. Id. 
One of these procedures i* >er service. Proper service h lfoi i i is parties wl lat 
action is being taken and why. It gives them information about the grounds for the action 
and it provides them with an opportunity to respond. In simple terms, it tells the parties 
what is happening and }«ives llu'in tunc In decide whai in do abnui n Process, t\~v \ro 
Jur2d§106. 
With this in mind, the drafters of Utah procedural rules have issued a blanket 
requirement for proper service of nearly all legal papers: 
Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the 
court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every 
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pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to 
discovery, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex 
parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and 
similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
Utah R.Civ. 5(a)(1) (2002). Under this rule, courts have upheld the requirement of proper 
service in almost every situation.11 And, Utah courts have held that certain information 
must be communicated to the person being served. For instance, the charges must be 
stated, the grounds of an action or order must be communicated, State v. CowdelL 626 
P.2d 487,488 (Utah 1981), and any legal consequence cannot reach beyond the scope of 
the information served. Department of Registration of Pep't of Bus. Regulation v. Stone. 
587 P.2d 137, 139 (Utah 1978). 
Protective orders are not an exception to the service requirement. If anything, there 
is a greater reason for proper service of protective orders than for service of other types of 
papers. This is because, without service, respondents may be completely unaware of the 
order or its contents or the consequences of a violation. Such orders are often issued ex 
parte, Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2 (Supp. 2002), and the threshold showings required to 
obtain them are fairly low. Id Additionally, respondents usually do not have the benefit 
of counsel. In many ways, respondents are unusually vulnerable to infringements upon 
their rights. 
Nobody denies that the interests of those seeking protective orders justifies special 
11
 See e.g. Cooke v. Cooke. 2001 UT App 110,1(13, 22 P.3d 1249 (petition for divorce 
must be served); State v. Grate. 947 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (orders to show cause 
must be served). 
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handling within the court system. In fact, this circumstance is probably unavoidable. 
Those suffering from abuse need protective orders quickly and do not have the time or 
expertise to proceed with complicated, time-consuming legal filings and appearances. Ex 
parte orders, lenient threshold showings for cause, and immediate losses of freedom or 
property belonging to the respondents are all, more or less, "necessary evils" of protective 
order actions. 
On the other hand, this does not mean that the requirement of proper service is 
dispensable. Proper service may be accomplished without compromising the goals of 
simplicity and expediency for petitioners. Service of the order is something that happens 
after the order is obtained, and after the petitioner has followed the appropriate steps. And 
so there is no justification for doing away with it. Indeed, proper service actually 
promotes the respondents' adherence to the orders, which is precisely the goal of issuing 
a protective order in the first place. 
Put another way, due process requires proper service of all protective orders, 
whether they are issued ex parte, pursuant to a traditional hearing, or even in the 
respondent's presence. This is because the respondent must have a written document to 
refer to, so that he or she can remember who and what to avoid, and what actions to take, 
and for how long. Further, possession of the written document acts as a forceful impetus 
to obey the order, and this is something to be desired. All in all, due process requires 
proper service and there is no reason to ignore this. 
The second set of laws requiring proper service of protective orders centers around 
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two statutes: Utah Code section 30-6-4.2, which provides for the issuance of protective 
order, and Utah Code section 76-5-108, which makes the violation of that order a crime. 
Both statutes specifically provide that a defendant must be properly served with the 
protection order. The pertinent portion of section 30-6-4.2 reads: 
A court may grant [specified] relief... whether or not the respondent 
appears . . . . Following [the issuance of the order], the court shall: (a) as 
soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for service of 
process; (b) make reasonable efforts to ensure that the order for protection 
is understood by the petitioner, and the respondent, if present 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(3)-(4) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). The pertinent portion 
of section 76-5-108 reads: 
Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order 
or ex parte protective order . . . who intentionally or knowingly violates that 
order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108(1) (1999) (emphasis added). 
The clear and unambiguous language of these statutes requires service of the 
protective order in all circumstances. Because of this, we needn't analyze them further. 
As this Court has repeatedly held, it is inappropriate to pedantically analyze statutory 
language that is already clear on its face: 
[The] primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative 
intent, as evidenced by the plain language . . . . We need look beyond the 
plain language only if we find some ambiguity When language is clear 
and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room if 
left for construction.12 
12
 State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ^ 10,452 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (quotations omitted). See 
also State v. McKinnon. 2002 UT App 214, ^ [6, 51 P.3d 729 ("To discern the legislature's intent 
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Furthermore, even if this Court looks beyond the plain language, it will find that 
proper service is emphatically required. When sections 30-6-43 and 76-5-108 were 
passed and later modified13 the legislature had a broad variety of language from other 
jurisdictions to consider. And much of this language is more liberal than the language 
chosen by the Utah drafters. For instance, the Hawaiian statute reads: 
Any [protective] order issued under this chapter shall either be personally 
served upon the respondent, or served by certified mail, unless the 
respondent was present at the hearing in which case the respondent shall be 
deemed to have notice of the order. 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-6 (2002). Likewise, the Colorado statute indicates that violation of 
a restraining order is committed: 
"after [the respondent] has been personally served with any such order or 
otherwise has acquired from the court actual knowledge of the contents of 
any such order." 
People v. Colebv. 34 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. 2001) (quoting C.R.S. § 18-6-803.5(1) 
(1997)). 
Some state statutes do not even mention service or notice. Instead, they 
incorporate this idea into the intent element of the crime of violating a protective order. 
and purpose, we look first to the 'best evidence of a statute's meaning, the plain language of the 
act."); State v. Yanez. 2002 UT App 50, fl3,42 P.3d 1248 ("Generally, 'our primary goal in 
interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language . 
. . . We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity."' (quotations 
omitted)). 
13
 Section 30-6-4.3 was passed in 1995 and modified in 1996, 1997, and 2001. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-6-4.3, History (Supp. 2001). Section 76-5-108 was passed in 1979 and modified in 
1984, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1999. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108, History (1999). 
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The Massachusetts statute does this. The courts there may find a defendant guilty of 
violating a protective order if the "the defendant had knowledge of the order." 
Commonwealth v. Silva. 727 N.E.2d 1150,1153 (Mass. 2000). And in Texas, the 
violation of a protective order is committed if one who is subject to an order "knowingly 
or intentionally" threatens violence or commits acts of violence. Harvey v. State. 78 
S.W.3d 368, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) Likewise, the Illinois statute allows for 
conviction merely for "knowingly" violating an order. People v. Ramos. 735 N.E.2d 
1094, 1098 (111. Ct. App. 2000). 
Another approach taken by some states is to avoid making violating a protective 
order a crime by prosecuting violators under the general criminal contempt statutes.14 
These are only a few examples of how the legislature may have chosen to handle 
the Utah protective order statutes. Yet, it chose instead in both sections 30-6-4.2 and 76-
5-109 to use clear language requiring proper service of all protective orders, regardless of 
the circumstances. At this point, to construe the statutes otherwise is to ignore basic rules 
of statutory construction and convolute an otherwise clear directive. 
A holding reflecting this is needed. So far, there has been scant interpretation of 
the "proper service" portions of sections 30-6-4.2 and 76-5-109. One exception is Murray 
City v. Culley. but that is an unpublished opinion that was sparsely briefed and issued 
nearly half a decade ago. In Culley. it was opined that service is probably not an element 
14
 Strane v. State, 16 P.3d 745, 747 (Ala. Ct. App. 2001); Brandt v. Brandt. 645 N.W.2d 
327, 330-31 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); People v. White. 727 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613-14 (2001). 
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of the crime of violating a protective order. Murray Citv v. Culley. No. 971672-CA, 1998 
WL 1758314, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Instead, the case reads, service is merely one 
way of showing that the defendant knowingly or intentionally violated the order. Id. In 
support of this opinion a Texas case and an Illinois case are cited. Id. at *2. At the 
conclusion of the opinion, this Court noted that, even if service is required, the defendant 
waived the issue in that case. Id. 
Murray City v. Culley is not binding law. It is unpublished and it was issued at a 
time when unpublished opinions were not binding precedent.15 Also, the service issue was 
not thoroughly briefed in that case. The appellant merely asserted that service was an 
element of the offense of violation of a protective order, and made cursory due process 
and statutory interpretation arguments.16 Without full consideration of the issue, the 
resulting opinion cannot stand as binding precedent. 
At any rate, to the extent that the opinion is considered binding it should be 
overruled. It contravenes the plain language of sections 30-6-4.2 and 76-5-109 and it does 
not take into account the legislature's intentional use of the words "proper service" as 
opposed to broader "knowledge" or "constructive notice" type of language. 
Additionally, the cases relied upon in the opinion are not persuasive in this 
jurisdiction. These cases are from Texas and Illinois, and neither state has a statute that is 
15
 Under Rule 31 of the 1998 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, unpublished opinions 
"will not stand as precedent...." Utah R.App. 31 (1998). 
16
 Murray Citv v. Culley Aplt. Br., No. 971672-CA. 
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similar to Utah's. In fact, the Texas statute does not mention service or notice at all. It 
simply states that: 
A person commits an offense if, in violation of a [protective] order . . . the 
person knowingly or intentionally . . . goes to or near any of the following 
places as specifically described in the protective order [including] the 
residence or place of employment or business or a member of the family or 
household. 
Small 809 S.W.2d at 255 (quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.08 (Vernon Supp. 1991). 
This statute uses broad language and requires only that the defendant act knowingly or 
intentionally in committing the offense. An interpretation of this statute cannot be used as 
a pattern for the law in our jurisdiction, where two statutes specifically require proper 
service of a protective order.17 
Likewise, the Illinois case is not persuasive authority. The Illinois statutes 
interpreted in that case do not mention notice or service. They provide only that any 
petition for a protection order shall name the respondent and give his address, and that a 
summons shall be issued to the respondent. In re S.A.C.. 498 N.E.2d 285, 286 (111. Ct. 
App. 1986). And, even with this broad language, the Illinois Court of Appeals found that 
some level of notice was required: 
where a court order affects the legal right of a person to associate with 
others, in this case a 14-year-old girl, fundamental fairness requires that 
such an order not be entered before the person to be subjected to the order 
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(4)(a) (Supp. 2002) (requiring service of process 
immediately after a hearing on a petition for a protective order, regardless of whether the 
respondent attended the hearing); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(1) (1999) (providing that a 
defendant may not be convicted of violating a protective order unless he has been properly 
served with the order). 
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has a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and be heard on the 
matter. 
Id. at 287 (quotations omitted). And so, not only is the Illinois case unpersuasive because 
that state's statute differs from the Utah statutes, it does not even stand for the proposition 
that notice is not an element of the crime of violating a protective order. 
Lastly, the Culley opinion does not forward sound policy. Actual service of a 
protective order provides the respondent with notice of its contents, and this notice is 
absolutely necessary. Besides informing the respondent that certain actions are now a 
crime for him or her, service of the order promotes adherence to it. A tangible copy gives 
an order the feeling of legitimacy. A respondent will be able to see that the order is court-
issued, and he or she may read what conduct is prohibited, and know when the order will 
end. This is better for the respondent, petitioner, and society at large. 
At any rate, in this case the requirement of proper service was unquestioned. This 
requirement was recognized by the trial court, which specifically stated that service was 
an element of the crime. R. 110 [86]. And the jury instruction included proper service as 
an element of the crime in the jury instructions. R. 64. Even the prosecutor did not 
question whether service was required in this case. Id. at 91, 99. And so, the requirement 
of proper service should not now be questioned on appeal. The only question should be 
whether the State made a prima facie case of service. 
With regard to that question, the record shows that the State did not make a prima 
facie showing of proper service. The State presented no evidence that Mr. Jensen was 
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served with the protective order, it presented only the protective order itself. R. 112. 
There is no notarized or witnessed signature from Mr. Jensen, no certificate of delivery or 
service, Id. at 5, and the State presented no witness testifying that he served Mr. Jensen 
with the order. Instead, there is only a final page with a statement that reads: 
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service[] of 
this Protective Order and waives the right to be personally served. 
Id. This is followed by a cursive signature reading "Lavar Jensen," and an instruction to 
"Serve Respondent at: 6985 So. Pine Mt. Dr. 84121." RL Nothing else appears. 
This is not enough to show service. In the first place, there is nothing to show that 
the signature is Mr. Jensen's. Without a notarization or other authentication, it cannot be 
assumed that Mr. Jensen is the person who signed the document. Anyone could have 
signed it. Second, even if the signature is Mr. Jensen's, it is not clear whether service or 
waiver of service was being attempted. The signed paragraph mentions both, but does not 
show that either occurred. R. 112 [5], Third, without proof of service, it cannot be 
assumed that Mr. Jensen received a copy of the order, which is the whole point of the 
service requirement. Lastly, nothing in the order shows that the order was shown to Mr. 
Jensen, or that it was explained to him, as required by statute.18 
Of course, the order does indicate that the parties stipulated to the provisions of the 
"Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order." However, the Petition is a different 
18
 Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(4)(b) (Supp. 2002) the trial court should "make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the order for protection is understood by the petitioner, and the 
respondent, if present." 
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document from the protective order itself. It may have had different allegations or even 
different proposed restrictions. It is the protective order itself that must be explained to 
the respondent and served upon him. And that was not done in this case. 
In short, nothing on the last page of the protective order meets the State's 
requirement of a prima facie showing of service. 
B. To Make a Prima Facie Showing of Service, the State Must Provide More 
Than Just the Protective Order 
Providing a certified copy of the protective order is the first step towards showing 
proper service, but this alone is not enough. The State must provide further evidence to 
show that Mr. Jensen was served with the order. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108(1) (1999). 
Under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,19 service may be made either by 
mailing or delivery: 
Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a 
copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if no address is 
known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. 
(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or 
to the party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in 
19
 Rule 5 is applicable to criminal proceedings under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Rule 3 reads: 
Whenever service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by 
an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney, unless service upon the 
party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party 
shall be made in the manner provided in civil actions. 
Utah RCrim. 3(b) (2002) (emphasis added). 
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charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous 
place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no 
office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with 
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or, if 
consented to in writing by the person to be served, delivering a copy by 
electronic or other means. 
(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. . . . 
Utah R.Civ. 5(b) (2002). Under this Rule, Utah courts have observed that a prima facie 
showing of service is made by a "sheriffs return of service," Southland Const, v. 
Semnani, 2001 UT 6, %29 20 P.3d 875, or by a certificate of mailing.20 These documents 
must have the correct name and address of the person served, plus an assertion that 
service was completed, or they are not valid.21 Another way to show service is to present 
testimony from the server that service was completed.22 Also, in circumstances where a 
legal document is signed, the signature must be authenticated either by notary23 or by the 
testimony of a handwriting analyzer.24 
In this case, we have none of that. We have only a page with cursive writing 
20
 See Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647, 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding that proper notice given when document mailed to the correct name and address and 
accompanied by an appropriate certificate of mailing.) 
21
 Southland Const.. 2001 UT 6, ^ [2; Baumgart, 851 P.2d at 652. 
22
 Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that testimony from a knowledgeable 
witness may be presented to authenticate evidence. Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(1) (2002). 
23
 Utah REvid. 902(1) (2002). 
24
 The authenticity of handwriting may be attested to either by a non-expert person who is 
familiar with the subject's handwriting or by an expert who compares the handwriting with 
authenticated specimens. Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(2) & (3) (2002). 
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reading "Lavar Jensen," and below that the address of "6985 So. Pine Mt. Dr. 84121." 
There is no certificate of service, testimony from the server, notary, or testimony from a 
handwriting analyzer. In these circumstances, the signature page cannot be considered 
either authenticated25 or self-authenticating.26 And so, the State has not met its 
25 Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence indicates that evidence must be authenticated: 
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter 
in question is what its proponent claims. 
Utah R. Evid. 901(a) (2002). The rule then lists several methods of authenticating evidence. Utah 
R. Evid. 901 (2002). Some of these methods are not explored in this section. However, since it is 
unlikely that the signature could be authenticated by any of these means, an exhaustive 
exploration is unnecessary. 
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 Rule 902 of the Utah Rules of Evidence indicates that some evidence, such as public 
documents or certified copies of public records, may be self-authenticated: 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not 
required with respect to the following: 
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a seal purporting 
to be that of the United States or of any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or 
insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands, or of a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency 
thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.... 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report or 
entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and 
actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any 
form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the 
certification, by certificate complying with Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule 
or complying with any law of the United States or of this state. 
Utah R.Evid. 902 (2002) (emphasis in original). 
In this case, although the protective order is certified copy, Mr. Jensen's signature on the 
last page is not notarized as required in subsection (1). And so, that page of the order cannot be 
used to make a prima facie showing of service. 
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requirement of making a prima-facie showing that Mr. Jensen was sewed. 
Case law supports this. One supporting case is Southland Construction v. Semnani. 
In that case the Utah Supreme Court evaluated the validity of a service of summons. 
Southland Const.. 2001 UT 6, ^ 2. The affidavit of service said only that the server had 
left a copy of the summons "for the defendant with John Doe (John Doe (refused ID.)) a 
person of suitable age and discretion there residing at 4346 S. Mulholland St., Salt Lake 
City his/her usual place of abode." Id There was nothing else. Id. The address mentioned 
was not alleged to be the defendant's, and there was no assertion that the defendant was 
served. Id at f 3. And so, a prima facie showing of service was not made. Id. atf5. 
Here, the State's showing of service is just as inadequate. The signature reading 
"Lavar Jensen" could have been written by anybody. There is no assurance that Mr. 
Jensen wrote the signature, read the protective order, or even saw the protective order. 
Also, the address given is not alleged to be Mr. Jensen's residence, workplace, or any 
other place associated with him. And the document does not show he was served there or 
anywhere else. As in Southland Construction, this showing is wholly inadequate. 
In sum, the State's failure to make a prima facie showing of service undermines 
Mr. Jensen's conviction, and it must be reversed as a matter of law. 
II. THE JURY SELECTION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT 
WAS TAINTED BY SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION 
The equal protection provision of the federal constitution prohibits the prosecutor 
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from using peremptory challenges to remove venire persons on the basis of gender. 
However, in this case the prosecutor did just that; she applied a sexual stereotype in 
deciding to remove two men, Mr. Steven Smith and Mr. Gary Neilson, from the venire. 
During voir dire, these men had raised their hands when the court asked the 
question: "Have any of you been involved in a domestic violence dispute either as a 
victim, a witness, or a defendant?" R. 110 [24]. As these men raised their hands, several 
other men and women raised their hands. However, the court asked for no further detail. 
Id. Then, during the jury selection, the prosecutor removed Mr. Smith and Mr. Neilson. 
R. 57. By way of explanation, the prosecutor said "logically I assumed that usually they 
would be on defendant's side, since more than likely than not men are the respondents to 
protective orders . . . . " R. 110 [32]. The prosecutor's assumption that these men were 
respondents to protective orders, rather than petitioners or even witnesses, is an illegal 
sexual stereotype. And the application of this stereotype tainted the jury selection. 
The law governing this issue centers around Batson v. Kentucky, issued in 1986. 
In that case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the jury selection process 
should not be hindered by the evils of social discrimination that undermined the fabric of 
our society in the past. Batson then went on to prohibit discrimination against African 
American venire persons. Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). This holding was 
readily extended to protect members of all cognizable racial minority groups in Holland 
v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,476-77 (1990). 
In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court examined the issue of gender discrimination in 
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jury selection. In that case the State of Alabama filed a paternity suit against a man on 
behalf of a mother and her minor child. J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). The 
venire consisted of thirty-six people, twelve men and twenty-four women. Id. The State 
used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to remove men and the defendant used all but one 
of his strikes to remove women. Id. The resulting jury consisted entirely of women. IdL 
The defendant was found to be the father of the child and was ordered to pay child 
support. Id. He appealed, claiming that the prosecutor unconstitutionally discriminated 
against men in exercising his peremptory challenges. Id. at 129-30. 
The United States Supreme Court agreed. The Court declared: 
[t]oday we reaffirm what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional 
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to 
ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about 
the relative abilities of men and women. 
Id at 130-31. 
Attempting to justify the strikes, the State drew the Court's attention to the fact 
that the case involved a paternity action filed on behalf of a child bom out of wedlock. Id. 
at 137-38. The State argued that it was reasonable to strike virtually all of the men from 
the jury because, historically, male jurors had been disposed to accept the arguments of a 
man while female jurors were disposed to accept the arguments of the mother. Id. The 
Court flatly rejected this argument, declaring, "[w]e shall not accept as a defense to 
gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns.'" Id. at 138 
(citation omitted). The Court emphasized: 
30 
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender 
stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative 
abilities of men and women. Because these stereotypes have wreaked 
injustice in so many other spheres of our country's public life, active 
discrimination by litigants on the basis of gender during jury selection 
uinvites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to 
adhere to the law."27 
Addressing concern that its holding would severely cripple the important role of 
peremptory challenges in impaneling fair, impartial juries, the Court added that its 
holding "does not imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges." Id. at 143. On the 
contrary, "[p]arties still may remove jurors who they feel might be less acceptable than 
others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias." Id. 
Finally, the Court advised that, to avoid pretextual strikes, trial courts should 
conduct a thorough voir dire so that parties will have a firm basis upon which to exercise 
27
 Id at 140 (emphasis added) (quoting Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1991)). 
Significantly, the Court also noted: 
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to 
justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support 
discrimination on the basis of gender injury selection. We have made abundantly 
clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible 
stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical 
support can be conjured up for the generalization.... The generalization 
advanced by Alabama in support of its asserted right to discriminate on the basis 
of gender is, at the least, overbroad, and serves only to perpetuate the same 
'outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women, that we have 
invalidated in other contexts.'... The Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by 
decisions of this Court, acknowledges that a shred of truth may be contained in 
some stereotypes, but requires that state actors look beyond the surface before 
making judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize as well as to 
perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination. 
Id at 139 n.l 1 (citations omitted). 
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their peremptory strikes. Id at 143-44. The Court observed, "[i]f conducted properly, voir 
dire can inform litigants about potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and 
pejorative notions about a particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise." Id. at 
143. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that J.E.B. v. Alabama prohibits 
Utah prosecutors from purposefully discriminating against venire persons on the basis of 
their gender.28 Likewise, this Court holds that striking potential jurors solely on the basis 
of their gender violates the principal of equal protection. State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 
305,^28, 989 P.2d 503. 
When sexual discrimination occurs, a showing of harmfulness is not required. The 
conviction must simply be reversed. Sexual discrimination is a structural error that affects 
the entire trial from beginning to end, and it can never be considered harmless. State v. 
Russell 917 P.2d 557, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This reasoning is consistent with 
Batson v. Kentucky, which indicated that a showing of purposeful racial discrimination, 




 State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76,1J23 n.9, 12 P.3d 92; State v. ColwelL 2000 UT 8, If 14, 
994P.2dl77. 
29
 Batson. 476 U.S. at 100. See also State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454,459 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (Parties' stipulation that a showing of harm is not required where purposeful 
discrimination is shown is "consistent with the directive in Batson that if a court finds 
unrebutted, purposeful discrimination, 'precedents require that [a] petitioner's conviction be 
reversed.'") 
32 
In this case, the prosecutor removed two men from the jury because she assumed 
that they were respondents to protective orders. R. 110 [32]. This assumption was based 
solely on their gender. Id. Nothing else supported her assumption. The men had not 
indicated that they were respondents, and they did not otherwise imply that they had been 
respondents rather than petitioners or witnesses. The prosecutor's sex-based assumption 
that they were respondents is an illegal stereotype that requires reversal of Mr. Jensen's 
conviction. 
This is soundly demonstrated by the application of the Batson test for racial or 
sexual discrimination.30 The test has three parts. Under the first part of the test, the party 
alleging discrimination must proffer a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination. 
J.E.B..511 U.S. at 144-45. Once a prima facie showing has been proffered, "[t]he burden 
then shifts to the challenged party to show the existence of a [gender] neutral reason for 
the challenge." State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989). If the prosecutor's 
explanation is discriminatory on its face, the challenged peremptory strike violates the 
equal protection principal and the trial court must disallow the strike as a matter of law.31 
30
 J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 144-45; Batson. 476 U.S. at 96-99. 
31
 See Batson. 476 U.S. at 98 ("The prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral 
explanation related to the particular case to be tried. The trial court then will have the duty to 
determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.") (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted); State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153,155-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Once a race 
neutral explanation is proffered, the trial court must determine whether the explanation is a 
pretext for racial discrimination. This determination rests on the credibility of the proponent of 
the strike, and this Court "will not reverse the decision of the trial court unless it is clearly 
erroneous."); State v. Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (Because the final step 
requires the trial court to evaluate the credibility of the proponent of the strike, who has already 
proffered a race neutral explanation, the court's determination "will not be set aside unless it is 
33 
On the other hand, the prosecutor's explanation is gender-neutral, the trial court must 
proceed to determine whether purposeful sexual discrimination has tainted the jury 
selection process. Pharris, 846 P.2d at 464. 
This test is applied to the facts of this case in the sections below. 
A. The Prosecutor Waived the Requirement of a Prima Facie Showing of 
Sexual Discrimination 
Under the first part of the test, Mr. Jensen's defense counsel was required to make 
a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45. However, 
this requirement was waived by the prosecutor in this case. She did not wait for a prima 
facie showing before explaining her reasons for striking Mr. Smith and Mr. Neilson, R. 
110 [32], and she never complained that a prima facie showing had not been made. R. 
110 [31-32]. She did not even inform the court that a prima facie showing was required. 
Id. In these circumstances, the prima facie showing is deemed waived. 
The case law is unequivocal on this point. Under the United States Supreme Court 
case of Hernandez v. New York, the requirement of a prima facie showing is waived once 
the prosecutor explains the strike and the trial court rules on the ultimate issue of sexual 
discrimination: 
Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory 
clearly erroneous."); State v. Merrill 928 P.2d 401,403 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("'[U]nless a 
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed race neutral.' . . . [When the explanation is race neutral] the inquiry, as to whether 
Batson was violated, proceeds to step three.") (citations omitted). 
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challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of 
intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant 
had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). This principal is readily accepted by 
the lower federal courts, including the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 
1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991), and by the Utah state courts.32 In adopting the principal, the 
Utah Supreme Court explained that a prosecutor must actually challenge the sufficiency 
of the prima facie case to preserve it for appellate review: 
Where the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the 
sufficiency of the prima facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal 
explanation for the challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was 
established is waived. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547. 
In this case, the prosecutor did not challenge the sufficiency of the prima facie 
showing and so the issue is waived. 
However, even if this issue was not waived, the record shows that there is a prima 
facie case of sexual discrimination. The elements of a prima facie case were enunciated 
by this Court in State v. Shepherd: 
In Utah, the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case include: "(1) 
as complete a record as possible, (2) a showing that persons excluded 
belong to a cognizable group . . . and (3) a showing that there exists 'a 
strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their 
group association rather than because of any specific bias.5"33 
32
 Colwell. 2000 UT 8,1(18; Bowman, 945 P.2d at 155 n.2; Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403. 
33
 State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305,1(29, 989 P.2d 503 (quoting State v. Alvarez. 872 
P.2d 450,456 (Utah 1994)). 
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In this case, those elements appear. The prosecutor used one hundred percent of 
her strikes to eliminate men.34 And the defendant that she was prosecuting, Mr. Jensen, is 
a man who was charged with violating a protective order obtained by Ms. Thomas, a 
woman. Further, there was no apparent reason for Mr. Smith's and Mr. Neilsen's 
dismissals. They did not say anything that would make them clearly undesirable from a 
prosecutorial point of view, and they did not appear to be incompetent. R. 110 [14-15]. 
These facts alone make a prima facie showing of gender discrimination.35 
On top of this, however, this case justifies careful scrutiny for gender 
discrimination because it involves an implication of domestic violence, which is a gender-
R. 57. Each party exercised three peremptory strikes. Id 
35
 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (pattern of striking members of cognizable racial group may 
give rise to inference of discrimination); Maddox v. State. 708 So.2d 220, 224 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1997) (prima facie case established where prosecutor used nine of his eleven peremptory 
challenges to strike men); People v. Gandv. 878 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)Jprima facie 
case established where venire consisted of eleven men and fourteen women, and prosecutor used 
all six of his peremptory challenges to strike men); State v. Bourgeois. 786 S.2d 771, 776 (La. 
Ct. App. 2001) (prima facie case established where prosecutor exhibited a pattern of striking 
men from the jury where "[n]o obvious reason for the strikes other than gender appear of 
record."); State v. Call. 508 S.E.2d 496, 510 (N.C. 1998) (Factors to consider in evaluating 
whether a prima facie case has been established "include the gender of the defendant, the victim 
and any key witnesses; questions and comments made by the prosecutor during jury selection 
which tend to support or contradict an inference of gender discrimination; the frequent exercise 
of peremptory challenges to prospective jurors of one gender that tends to establish a pattern, or 
the use of a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges against venire members of one 
gender; whether the State exercised all of its peremptory challenges; and the ultimate gender 
makeup of the jury."); State v. Turner. 879 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tenn. 1994); Pharris. 846 P.2d at 
458 (this Court found a prima facie case of racial discrimination where prosecutor used three of 
his four peremptory challenges to strike Native Americans); State v. Donaghv. 769 A.2d 10, 12 
(Vt. 2000) (prima facie case established where venire consisted often women and eleven men, 
and prosecutor used six strikes to eliminate men and one strike to eliminate a woman); Payne v. 
Gundy. 468 S.E.2d 335, 340, 343 (W. Va. 1996) (prima facie case established where venire 
consisted of nine men and three women, and prosecutor used two of his three peremptory strikes 
to eliminate women). 
36 
sensitive issue. Courts across the country are particularly diligent in scrutinizing jury 
selection proceedings when cases involve domestic violence, rape, sexual harassment, 
and other gender-sensitive issues. This is because such cases provide the most fertile 
ground for the growth of sexual discrimination injury selection: 
The potential for cynicism is particularly acute in cases where gender-
related issues are prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual 
harassment, or paternity. Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may 
create the impression that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing 
full participation by one gender of that the "deck has been stacked" in favor 
of one side.36 
And so, in this case the trial court should have been particularly concerned about 
the possibility of sexual discrimination, and immediately investigated any such 
possibilities. This, along with the fact that the prosecutor used one hundred percent of her 
strikes to eliminate men from the jury, and the lack of any apparent reasons to dismiss 
them, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sexual discrimination. 
B. The Prosecutor's Explanation for her Strikes was not Gender-Neutral 
The second part of the three-part test requires the prosecutor to come forward with 
a gender-neutral explanation for the challenged dismissals. J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 145. The 
explanation "must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered 
36
 J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 140. See also Donaghv. 769 A.2d at 14 ("Because this case involves 
the gender-related issue of domestic violence, we review it with a keen eye to preventing state-
sanctioned discrimination); Payne, 468 S.E. 2d at 343 ("inasmuch as this action involves a case 
of alleged domestic assault and battery, it comports with the admonition of J.E.B.. set forth 
above, that the potential for cynicism in the face of gender discrimination in the jury selection 
process 'is particularly acute in cases . . . involving rape, sexual harassment, or paternity."') 
37 
explanation may not be pretextual." J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 145. In other words, it is not 
enough for the prosecutor merely to state that there was no intentional discrimination.37 
There must be substance to the explanation. Specifically, it must be related to the case 
being tried, and it must be clear and reasonably specific. Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518. 
In this case, the prosecutor's explanation was not gender-neutral. It was based 
upon the sexual stereotype that men are the respondents, rather than the petitioners or 
witnesses, to protective orders. Her explanation was as follows: 
I didn't even initially realize that all three of [my strikes] were men, all 
three of my challenges were men until [the defense counsel] pointed it out. / 
have on my notations that the three struck were part of the protective order, 
and logically I assumed that usually they would be on defendant's side, 
since more than likely than not men are the respondents to protective 
orders, other than women. Those were my reasoning. I also struck - 1 don't 
have his name here - the first male, because he was an engineer, I - my 
reasoning being someone that - 1 would want someone that's less 
analytical. 
R. 110 [32] (emphasis added). This explanation demonstrates that the prosecutor relied on 
a sexual stereotype in striking Mr. Smith and Mr. Neilson from the jury.38 She assumed 
that these men, both of whom had indicated involvement with protective orders, were the 
perpetrators of the violence. Id at 33-34. She also assumed that women involved with 
37
 Pharns, 846 P.2d at 463 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). 
38
 Mr. Jensen does not appeal the prosecutor's strike against Mr. Dallas Jolley. This strike 
was based, not only upon his involvement with a protective order, but also on the prosecutor's 
wish to avoid having such analytical persons on the jury. Id. This "analytical" explanation 
provides a basis for his dismissal that is separate from the sexual discriminatory basis, and so the 
strike is legitimate under the Batson jurisprudence. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153,157. 
38 
protective orders were not. These assumptions show that sexual discrimination was 
inherent in her strikes, and they should have been prevented by the trial court. 
Persuasive case law supports this. For example, in Commonwealth v. Tourschen 
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated a conviction for several crimes of domestic 
violence because the prosecutor "blatantly stated that she struck six female venirepersons 
because 'from prosecuting domestic cases [she has found] that women are a lot tougher 
on domestic cases . . . . ' " Commonwealth v. Tourscher, 682 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1996) (citation omitted). And then, in a case of incest, the Louisiana Court of Appeals 
remanded for a Batson hearing because the prosecutor commented before the trial and 
during the impanelment that he was trying to keep men off the jury. Bourgeois, 786 So.2d 
at 775. 
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a rape conviction because the 
prosecutor's explanation for removing a black woman from the jury was that "there are 
some authorities who believe that the fewer the women that you have on a rape case, the . 
. . as jurors, the better." Maddox, 708 So.2d at 228. Finally, in a case involving two 
counts of incest, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's ruling that the 
defense counsel could not use his peremptory strikes to eliminate women from the jury 
after he admitted that he was trying to empanel an all-male jury. Turner, 879 S.W.2d at 
Three venire women, Mary Lee, Debra Jo Garrison, and Judith Mincher, indicated 
some involvement with protective orders, but they did not explain their involvement. R. 110 
[23]. Another woman, Tamra Earl, indicated that she had been a victim of an assault or 
protective order violation. Id. at 22-23. 
39 
821. 
Sometimes the discrimination is not blatant, but it is nonetheless illegal. For 
example, recently, the Supreme Court of Vermont remanded a case for a Batson hearing 
because the prosecutor used eighty-five percent of his strikes against men. Donaghy, 769 
A.2d at 14-15. That Court noted that "[w]hen men appear to be systematically removed 
from juries selected by a prosecutor [charged with prosecuting violent crimes against 
women], there is a strong inference of gender discrimination." Id. at 15. In another case, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed an assault and battery conviction because the 
prosecutor's explanation for using two of his three peremptory strikes to eliminate 
women was cursory and ambiguous and appeared to be a pretext for gender 
discrimination. Payne. 468 S.E.2d at 340. Also, the Colorado Court of Appeals remanded 
a case involving a conviction for burglary because the prosecutor dismissed six men from 
the jury. Gandy. 878 P.2d at 69. The prosecutor in Gandy had dismissed the men because 
his "profile for the ideal juror was, like the victim, an educated professional woman who 
resided in the same neighborhood and in a similar living situation." IdL at 70. The Court 
was dissatisfied with this answer, and remanded for further findings and rulings on the 
issue of gender discrimination. Id 
In this case, the prosecutor justified her dismissal of Mr. Smith and Mr. Neilson on 
the basis of her unfounded assumption that they were respondents in protective orders. 
This is sexual stereotyping and it is illegal. As the United States Supreme Court has said, 
we cannot accept an explanation that is based on "'the very stereotype the law 
40 
condemns/" J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 138 (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court should have 
disallowed the peremptory challenge, and should not have proceeded to the third part of 
the three-part test.40 Because the court did proceed, however, its ruling is examined in the 
next section. 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling that There was no Intentional Discrimination 
is Clearly Erroneous In Light of the Prosecutor's Stereotyping 
Under part three of the Batson test, a trial court should consider the prosecutor's 
explanation in light of the surrounding circumstances and decide whether there was 
intentional discrimination. Colwell 2000 UT 8,1J20-24. In making this determination, the 
trial court should keep in mind that there are several things that tend to show that the 
prosecutor's explanation is a pretext for discrimination: 
(1) [whether there is an] alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the 
juror in question, (2) [when there is] failure to examine the juror or 
perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing 
counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for special 
questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's 
reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on 
reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who were not challenged.41 
Ultimately, the trial court must determine whether the prosecutor's explanation is "'(1) 
neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) 
See Bowman. 945 P.2d at 155 ("If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court 
must then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 
discrimination.") (quoting Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 547). 
41
 Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518-19. See also State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329, 342-43 (Utah 1991). 
41 
legitimate.5" Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518 (citation omitted). 
Applying this law demonstrates that the prosecutor discriminated against Mr. 
Smith and Mr. Neilson on the basis of gender. She assumed that, because they had 
indicated some involvement with protective orders, they were the accused perpetrators of 
domestic violence. She said that, "logically [] assumed that usually they would be on 
defendant's side, since more than likely than not men are the respondents to protective 
orders " R. 110 [32]. This explanation is inherently discriminatory because it assigns 
certain opinions, sympathies, and tendencies to Mr. Smith and Mr. Neilson solely on the 
basis of their gender. 
Further, sexual discrimination is apparent because there is no explanation for Mr. 
Smith's and Mr. Neilson's dismissal other than the prosecutor's application of a sexual 
stereotype. These men appeared neither incompetent nor intellectually lacking. Id. at 14-
15. Nor did they say anything that would tend to show bias towards the defense. And, 
neither of them had any characteristics that would be undesirable from a prosecutorial 
point of view.42 
42
 The record shows the following information about Mr. Smith: he has lived in Salt Lake 
County all of his life, and he is married. R. 110 [14]. He went to BYU and works as a car dealer. 
Id. And, he raised his hand in response to the court's question: "Have any of you or your close 
friends or relatives that you're aware of, of course, ever been a petitioner or a respondent in 
terms of a protective order?" Id. at 23. He also raised his hand in response to the court's 
question: "Have any of you been involved in a domestic violence dispute either as a victim, a 
witness, or a defendant?" Id. at 24. 
The record shows the following information about Mr. Neilson: he has lived in Salt Lake 
County all his life and he is single. Id at 16. He is studying to be an EMT and he works as a 
heavy equipment operator. Id. He raised his hand in response to the court's question: "Have any 
42 
The trial court did not take any of this into account in evaluating whether sexual 
discrimination had occurred. R. 110 [34]. Indeed, the trial court gave only scant support 
for its finding of no sexual discrimination. The court merely observed that, because Mr. 
Smith and Mr. Neilson were involved in some way with protective orders, their exclusion 
is justifiable. Id The court said: 
I note that indeed they did, in terms of my notes here, were involved in 
some capacity with protective orders, and I think that we had left that open 
and not pursued that further in terms of as defendants, victims, and so forth 
and so on. I think that is a basis - 1 find that that's a basis to exclude them, 
and of course that then is a basis other than gender. 
Id. However, this ruling is fatally flawed. It ignores the fact that the prosecutor applied a 
sexual stereotype to determine that Mr. Smith and Mr. Neilson had been the respondents 
to protective orders. Id. at 32. And then she excluded them on that basis. Id. 
Put differently, she did not exclude them simply because they had been involved in 
protective orders, but because of her assumption that they were respondents to protective 
orders. That is illegal sexual stereotyping and it is prohibited by J.E.B. Because of this, 
Mr. Jensen's conviction should be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial. 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO HOLD TRIAL WITHOUT A 
CRUCIAL DEFENSE WITNESS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
A crucial defense witness, Ms. Thomas, did not appear at trial. Ms. Thomas was 
of you or your close friends or relatives that you're aware of, of course, ever been a petitioner or 
a respondent in terms of a protective order?" Id at 23. He also raised his hand in response to the 
court's question: "Have any of you been involved in a domestic violence dispute either as a 
victim, a witness, or a defendant?" Id at 24. 
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the petitioner who filed for the protective order that Mr. Jensen was charged with 
violating. R. 112. Her testimony, and the impeachment of her expected statements, would 
have established that she told Mr. Jensen and several other people that the protective 
order had been dismissed. R. 110 [52]. It would have established that she continued her 
relationship with Mr. Jensen for two years after petitioning for a protective order against 
him. IdL It also would have shown that she made conflicting statements to police officers 
about alleged assaults. Id. at 54. Ultimately, it would have established that Mr. Jensen did 
not knowingly or intentionally43 violate a protective order. Without it, the defense was 
crippled. 
Immediately after the defense counsel discovered that Ms. Thomas had not 
appeared for trial, he motioned for a continuance. R. 110 [42-43]. The court denied the 
motion on the grounds that Ms. Thomas was not subpoenaed by the defense. IcL at 44. 
Then the defense counsel explained that he had not subpoenaed Ms. Thomas because the 
State had subpoenaed her already, and had assured that she would be at trial. Id at 60-61. 
However, the court reiterated its denial of the motion. The defense counsel then asked for 
an advance ruling regarding the admissibility of statements that he had intended to 
present which would impeach statements Ms. Thomas had made to the police and others. 
Id. at 44-45. The court denied this motion on the grounds that it was hearsay. Id. at 58. 
The trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion 
43
 To convict a defendant of violating a protective order the prosecutor must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ''intentionally or knowingly" violated the order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1) (1999). 
44 
because it overlooked the due process and confrontational provisions of the federal 
constitution. Under due process,44 a defendant must have a meaningful opportunity to 
present his defense. State v. Garcia. 965 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This means 
that he must be allowed to present evidence that is material to that defense.45 In this case, 
material evidence included evidence that: 1) Ms. Thomas told Mr. Jensen and others that 
the protective order had been lifted; 2) that she continued her relationship with Mr. Jensen 
for two years after petitioning for the protective order; and 3) that she gave conflicting 
reports to the police about alleged domestic violence. R. 110 [52-54]. All of this supports 
Mr. Jensen's defense that he did not know that a protective order was in place. Without 
Ms. Thomas this information could not be presented. In these circumstances, the trial 
court's decision to move forward effectively denied Mr. Jensen due process. 
44
 The due process provisions of the federal constitution are found in the Fifth 
Amendment, which reads "nor shall any person... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law ...," U.S. Const, amend. V, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
reads "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1. 
45
 Id Evidence is material to a defense if it is substantial enough that its absence casts 
doubt on the fairness of the verdict: 
[The] touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a different result 
[had the evidence in question been admitted], and the adjective is important. The 
question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair 
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. 
State v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45,1(31, 979 P.2d 799 (citation omitted). And so, the test is not 
whether the admission of the evidence would have changed the verdict, but whether the 
suppression "'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Id. (quoting United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). 
45 
The trial court's decision also overlooked Mr. Jensen's constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against him.46 Under the confrontation clause, a defendant has the 
right to cross-examine the witnesses against him and impeach their testimonies if he is 
able. State v. Chavez. 2002 UT App 9, 1J18, 41 P.3d 1137. This right is so compelling that 
it is considered essential to a fair trial. State v. Kendrick. 538 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah 1975). 
In this case, evidence of Ms. Thomas' statements to the police were presented, R. 
110 [66-75], and the protective order she obtained was submitted, R. 112, but Mr. Jensen 
never received an opportunity to cross-examine her. This violates Mr. Jensen's right to 
confront the witnesses against him. As the United States Supreme Court has held, out-of-
court statements and written papers cannot take the place of the presence of the witness at 
trial: 
The primary object of the [confrontation provision] was to prevent 
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil 
cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and 
cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, 
not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, 
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they 
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner 
in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.47 
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed, and has held that, where no opportunity to cross-
examine is provided, the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
The confrontation provision of the federal constitution is found in the Sixth 
Amendment, which reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ." U.S. Const, amend. VI. This provision was 
extended to the states in the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const amend. XIV, § 1. 
47
 California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970) (citation omitted). 
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trial.4 Accordingly, in this case Mr. Jensen's conviction must be reversed. 
It is true that the defense counsel did not subpoena Ms. Thomas himself, but relied 
on the State's representation that Ms. Thomas had been subpoenaed. However, this does 
not justify the trial court's decision to deny the defense counsel's motion for a 
continuance. The defense counsel's reliance on the prosecutor's representations was 
reasonable. Prosecutors typically have freer access to their witnesses, as well as more 
trust from the alleged victims. And so their representations about whether victims or 
witnesses will appear are usually reliable. The defense counsel's reliance upon these 
representations was understandable. 
The case of State v. Trover is directly on point. In that case, the defendant was 
placed in prison but wished to be transferred to the county jail. State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 
1182,1185 (Utah 1996). He feared that an informant was "planted" at the prison and 
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 Kendrick, 538 P.2d at 315. In Kendrick. two men, "Travis" and "Kendrick" were 
charged with robbery. Id. at 314. After appropriate motions, the cases were severed. Id, At his 
trial, Travis testified that Kendrick had committed the robbery. Id But when he was brought in 
to testify at Kendrick's trial, he refused to answer any questions. Id. Finally, he was charged with 
contempt of court and removed. Id. Then, over objection from the defense counsel, the 
prosecutor read Travis' testimony from his own trial. Id On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that this violated Kendrick's right to confront the witnesses against him: 
The problem has been before the United States Supreme Court wherein the rule 
has been laid down that the right of a defendant to confront the witnesses against 
him is a fundamental right and is essential to a fair trial. Right of confrontation is 
based upon the notion that the accused should have an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In this case defendant had no opportunity to 
confront Travis, nor did his counsel have an opportunity to cross-examine him. 
The fact that the prosecutor cross-examined Travis at his trial cannot be 
substituted for the defendant's right of cross-examination. 
Id at 315 (citing Pointer v. Texas. 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). 
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would try to obtain evidence against him. IdL at 1185-86. He filed a motion for a transfer, 
but the prosecutor opposed it. Id. In its argument, the prosecutor assured the defendant 
and the trial court that an informant was not planted at the prison, and there was no need 
for a transfer. Id On this basis, the defendant did not pursue his motion to transfer. Id at 
1186. Later, to the surprise of all, the prosecutor attempted to introduce the testimony of 
an informant who had been planted at the prison. Id. The trial court suppressed this 
evidence, and the State appealed. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
decision. Id at 1195. The Court explained that, because the defendant had relied on the 
State's assurances and this reliance was reasonable, the State could not breach its promise 
and thereby profit. IdL 
While there is no indication here that the prosecutor consciously attempted to 
deceive the defense counsel or Mr. Jensen, the prosecutor did assure the defense that Ms. 
Thomas had been subpoenaed. R. 110 [60]. And, as did the defendant in Trover. Mr. 
Jensen reasonably relied upon this assurance to his detriment. That detriment came when 
the trial court denied his motion for a continuance based on the fact that Mr. Jensen had 
not subpoenaed Ms. Thomas himself. Id at 44. This ruling ignored Mr. Jensen's 
reasonable reliance on the prosecutor's representation. 
Finally, there was no practical reason for the trial court to deny the defense 
counsel's motion for a continuance. For one thing, the State would not have been 
prejudiced by the continuance. There is no indication that any of its witnesses would have 
been unavailable later or that its case would have deteriorated in some way. Indeed, the 
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only harm would have been to Mr. Jensen, who's time in jail would have been prolonged 
as he waited for the criminal justice process to run its course.49 Secondly, the only 
practical result of granting the motion would have been the appearance of Ms. Thomas in 
court, and this was crucial to the defense's case. All in all, the court's failure to grant the 
motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion. 
Further, this error was harmful to Mr. Jensen.50 The crux of the defense was to be 
testimony from Ms. Thomas that she told Mr. Jensen and others that the protective order 
had been lifted, and that she continued her relationship with Mr. Jensen for two years 
after petitioning for a protective order. R. 110 [48-54]. Also, she had told conflicting 
stories to police. IdL Further, the defense planned to show that Ms. Thomas arranged this 
prosecution well in advance for reasons of vengeance and spite,51 and not because she 
was afraid of Mr. Jensen, or for any other legitimate reason. Without Ms. Thomas at trial, 
Mr. Jensen was not able to present any of this, and the defense was severely crippled. 
In sum, the trial court's denial of Mr. Jensen's motion for a continuance denied 
See R. 93 (showing Mr. Jensen was not released until after trial). 
50
 Before Mr. Jensen's conviction may be reversed on the basis of the trial court's error in 
denying the motion for a continuance, harmfulness must be shown. Chavez, 2002 UT App. 9, 
1122. 
51
 The defense counsel intended to present evidence that, on the day that Ms. Thomas 
reported that Mr. Jensen had violated the protective order, Ms. Thomas' neighbor, Mr. Johnson, 
heard her tell Mr. Jensen "F you. I'm going to get you." R. 110 [49]. And, she told Deputy 
Lindgren that Mr. Jensen had assaulted her, but she told Deputy Nelson that she only found his 
wallet in her home. Id Further, in another case of this type that is over a year old, Ms. Thomas 
deliberately gave authorities a false address for Mr. Jensen so that he would not get arrested, but 
so she would have "some leverage over him." R. 110 [51]. 
49 
him his right of due process and his right to confront the witnesses against him. And, it 
was an abuse of discretion that proved harmful to the defense. In these circumstances, Mr. 
Jensen's conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jensen respectfully asks this Court to reverse his conviction on the grounds 
that the State failed to show that he was properly served with the protective order he is 
accused of violating. Alternatively, Mr. Jensen asks this Court to reverse his conviction 
and remand this case for a new trial either because: 1) the prosecutor sexually 
discriminated against two veniremen during jury selection, or 2) the trial court's denial of 
Mr. Jensen's motion for a continuance was a harmful abuse of discretion. 
SUBMITTED this i2**~ day of September, 2002. 
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167 COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 30-6-4.2 
(11) "Protective order" means a restraining order issued pursuant to 
this chapter subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the 
petitioner has given notice in accordance with this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 30-6-1, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 2000, added Subsection 
1979, ch. Il l , § 1; 1989, ch. 32, § 1; 1990, ch. (2)(e), redesignating existing Subsection (2Xe) 
183, § 15; 1991, ch. 180, § 2; 1993, ch. 137, as (2)(f) and making a related change. 
§ 3; 1995, ch. 300, § 2; 1996, ch. 244, § 2; The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 
1997, ch. 303, § 1; 1998, ch. 282, § 12; 2000, 2001, added "which" after "the District of Co-
ch. 170, § 1; 2001, ch. 9, § 51. lumbia" in Subsection (8). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998); Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, 
18 R3d 1129. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of expert testimony "Cohabitation" for purposes of domestic vio-
regarding questions of domestic law, 66 lence statutes, 71 A.L.R.5th 285. 
A.L.R.5th 135. 
30-6-2. Abuse or danger of abuse — Protective orders. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability. had suffered physical abuse or domestic vio-
To obtain a protective order under this sec- lence, as defined by § 77-36-1; and (3) she had 
tion, petitioner was required only to demon- an imminent fear of physical harm, or "a 
strate: (1) she is or was a cohabitant of the present fear of future abuse." Bailey v. Bayles, 
respondent, as denned by § 30-6-1(1); (2) she 2001 UT App 34, 18 R3d 1129. 
30-6-4.2. Protective orders — Ex parte protective orders 
— Modification of orders — Service of process — 
Duties of the court. 
(1) If it appears from a petition for an order for protection or a petition to 
modify an order for protection that domestic violence or abuse has occurred or 
a modification of an order for protection is required, a court may: 
(a) without notice, immediately issue an order for protection ex parte or 
modify an order for protection ex parte as it considers necessary to protect 
the petitioner and all parties named to be protected in the petition; or 
(b) upon notice, issue an order for protection or modify an order after a 
hearing, whether or not the respondent appears. 
(2) A court may grant the following relief without notice in an order for 
protection or a modification issued ex parte: 
(a) enjoin the respondent from threatening to commit or committing 
domestic violence or abuse against the petitioner and any designated 
family or household member; 
(b) prohibit the respondent from harassing, telephoning, contacting, or 
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; 
(c) order that the respondent is excluded from the petitioner's residence 
and its premises, and order the respondent to stay away from the 
residence, school, or place of employment of the petitioner, and the 
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premises of any of these, or any specified place frequented by the 
petitioner and any designated family or household member; 
(d) upon finding that the respondent's use or possession of a weapon 
may pose a serious threat of harm to the petitioner, prohibit the respon-
dent from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other weapon 
specified by the court; 
(e) order possession and use of an automobile and other essential 
personal effects, and direct the appropriate law enforcement officer to 
accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the 
petitioner is safely restored to possession of the residence, automobile, and 
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respon-
dent's removal of personal belongings; 
(f) grant temporary custody of any minor children to the petitioner; 
(g) order any further relief that the court considers necessary to provide 
for the safety and welfare of the petitioner and any designated family or 
household member; and 
(h) if the petition requests child support or spousal support, at the 
hearing on the petition order both parties to provide verification of current 
income, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements of 
year-to-date or other period of earnings, as specified by the court, and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year. 
(3) A court may grant the following relief in an order for protection or a 
modification of an order after notice and hearing, whether or not the respon-
dent appears: 
(a) grant the relief described in Subsection (2); and 
(b) specify arrangements for parent-time of any minor child by the 
respondent and require supervision of that parent-time by a third party or 
deny parent-time if necessary to protect the safety of the petitioner or 
child. 
(4) Following the protective order hearing, the court shall: 
(a) as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for service 
of process; 
(b) make reasonable efforts to ensure that the order for protection is 
understood by the petitioner, and the respondent, if present; 
(c) transmit, by the end of the next business day after the order is 
issued, a copy of the order for protection to the local law enforcement 
agency or agencies designated by the petitioner; and 
(d) transmit a copy of the order to the statewide domestic violence 
network described in Section 30-6-8. 
(5) (a) Each protective order shall include tv/o separate portions, one for 
provisions, the violation of which are criminal offenses, and one for 
provisions, the violation of which are civil violations, as follows: 
(i) criminal offenses are those under Subsections (2)(a) through (e), 
and under Subsection (3)(a) as it refers to Subsections (2)(a) through 
(e); and 
(ii) civil offenses are those under Subsections (2)(f) through (h), and 
Subsection (3)(a) as it refers to Subsections (2)(f) through (h). 
(b) The criminal provision portion shall include a statement that 
violation of any criminal provision is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) The civil provision portion shall include a notice that violation of or 
failure to comply with a civil provision is subject to contempt proceedings. 
(6) The protective order shall include: 
(a) a designation of a specific date, determined by the court, when the 
civil portion of the protective order either expires or is scheduled for 
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review by the court, which date may not exceed 150 days after the date the 
order is issued, unless the court indicates on the record the reason for 
setting a date beyond 150 days; 
(b) information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate identifica-
tion of the respondent, such as social security number, driver license 
number, date of birth, address, telephone number, and physical descrip-
tion; and 
(c) a statement advising the petitioner that: 
(i) after three years from the date of issuance of the protective 
order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the criminal portion of the 
protective order; 
(ii) the petitioner should, within the 30 days prior to the end of the 
three-year period, advise the court of the petitioner's current address 
for notice of any hearing; and 
(iii) the address provided by the petitioner will not be made 
available to the respondent. 
(7) Child support and spouse support orders issued as part of a protective 
order are subject to mandatory income withholding under Title 62A, Chapter 
11, Part 4, Income Withholding in IV-D Cases, and Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 
5, Income Withholding in Non IV-D Cases, except when the protective order is 
issued ex parte. 
(8) (a) The county sheriff that receives the order from the court, pursuant to 
Subsection (5)(a), shall provide expedited service for orders for protection 
issued in accordance with this chapter, and shall transmit verification of 
service of process, when the order has been served, to the statewide 
domestic violence network described in Section 30-6-8. 
(b) This section does not prohibit any law enforcement agency from 
providing service of process if that law enforcement agency: 
(i) has contact with the respondent and service by that law enforce-
ment agency is possible; or 
(ii) determines that under the circumstances, providing service of 
process on the respondent is in the best interests of the petitioner. 
(9) (a) When an order is served on a respondent in a jail or other holding 
facility, the law enforcement agency managing the facility shall make a 
reasonable effort to provide notice to the petitioner at the time the 
respondent is released from incarceration. 
(b) Notification of the petitioner shall consist of a good faith reasonable 
effort to provide notification, including mailing a copy of the notification to 
the last-known address of the victim. 
(10) (a) A court may modify or vacate an order of protection or any 
provisions in the order after notice and hearing, except as limited under 
Subsection (10)(b). 
(b) Criminal provisions of a protective order may not be vacated within 
three years of issuance unless the petitioner: 
(i) is personally served with notice of the hearing as provided in 
Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the petitioner 
personally appears before the court and gives specific consent to the 
vacation of the criminal provisions of the protective order; or 
(ii) submits a verified affidavit, stating agreement to the vacation of 
the criminal provisions of the protective order. 
(11) A protective order may be modified without a showing of substantial 
and material change in circumstances. 
(12) Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding protective orders, the provisions of this 
chapter govern. 
ADDENDUM C 
729 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 901 
Advisory Commit tee Note . — This rule is of Evidence (1971), contained a comparable 
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 65, Utah Rules provision. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence $ 337 et seq. 
dence 1983 — Par t III, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683. 
Am. Jur. 2d . — 29 Am. Jur . 2d Evidence 
§§ 254, 267 et seq. 
ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identifica-
tion. 
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as 
a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding t h a t the mat ter in question is what its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, 
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with 
the requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it 
is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genu-
ineness of handwri t ing, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the 
litigation. 
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or 
by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated. 
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, 
internal pat terns , or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction 
wi£h circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or 
through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based 
upon hearing the voice a t any time under circumstances connecting it with the 
alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a 
call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company 
to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, 
including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or 
(B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business and the 
conversation related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence tha t a writing authorized by law to be 
recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported 
public record, report, s tatement , or data compilation, in any form, is from the 
public office where i tems of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or 
data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion 
concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would 
likely be, and (C) h a s been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is 
offered. 
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to 
produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate 
result. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or 
identification provided by court rule or s ta tute of this state. 
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note . — Subdivision is comparable with Rule 67, Utah Rules of 
(b)(2) is in accord with S ta te v. Freshwater, 30 Evidence (1971), except that the former rule 
Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447(1906). Subdivision (bK8) impostxi a 30-year requirement. Subdivision 
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(bXlO) is an adaptation of subdivision (10) in 
the comparable federal rules to conform to state 
practice. 
Cross-References. — Official record, 
thentication of copy, U.R.C.P. 44(a). 
Writings, manner of proof, § 78-25-9. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavits. 
Identification testimony. 
Nonexpert opinion on handwrit ing. 
Photographs. 
Public records or reports. 
Affidavits. 
An affidavit that was undated, unpaginated, 
lacked a typical attestation at the end, did not 
say whether the affiant was making the state-
ment from personal knowledge, and did not 
state that the affiant had even read the docu-
ment was properly excluded. Sta te v. Chaney, 
1999 UT App 309, 989 P.2d 1091. 
Identification test imony. 
Voice identification under this rule does not 
involve the same concerns about reliability as 
eyewitness identification. Moreover, because 
the trial court engaged in an analysis akin to 
that required for admitt ing eyewitness identi-
fication, in response to defendant's claim that 
the identification procedure was unduly sug-
gestive, defendant's due process rights were not 
violated. State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, 13 
P.3d 604. 
Nonexpert opinion on handwr i t ing . 
Writing may be proved by evidence of a 
witness who has seen the person write, even if 
the witness has seen him write only once and 
then only his name. The proof in such case may 
be very light, but the jury will be permitted to 
weigh it. State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 
P. 447 (1906) (referred to in Advisory Commit-
tee Note). 
Before allowing the proponent to provide 
authentication testimony on samples of defen-
dant's handwriting, the trial court should re-
quire testimony as to the origin of proponent's 
familiarity with defendant's handwrit ing, and, 
in particular, whether it was acquired for pur-
poses of the current litigation. State v. Jacques 
924 P.2d 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Court's error in admitting authentication tes-
timony and related evidence was not harmless. 
State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898 (Utah Ct. App 
1996). 
Photographs . 
In general, if a competent witness with per-
sonal knowledge of the facts represented by a 
photograph testifies that the photograph accu-
rately reflects those facts, it is admissible, and 
any minor discrepancies in the testimony 
which go only to the details of the time and 
place the picture was taken are not material to 
the purpose for which the evidence is intro-
duced and they do not undermine the adequacy 
of the foundation for admissibility of the photo-
graphs. State v. Purcel], 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 
1985). 
Trial court's determination that a witness did 
not establish the accuracy of the perspective of 
a proffered photograph was reasonable; court 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
photograph for lack of proper authentication. 
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Publ ic records or reports. 
No Utah statute recognizes the certifying 
signature of a notary public, without more, as a 
proper means of authenticating an official doc-
ument as evidence. State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 
342 (Utah 1980). 
Copies of county court records, certified by a 
duly authorized notary*public who had no cus-
tody of the documents, official or unofficial, and 
who was not a deputy of the court clerk, the 
court clerk being the official custodian of the 
documents, did not constitute adequate au-
thentication. State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 
(Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983 — Part III, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur . 2d Evidence 
§ 8 4 9 e t s e q . 
C.J.S. — 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 819 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proof of authorship or identity of 
sender of telegram as prerequisi te of its admis-
sion in evidence, 5 A.L.R.3d 1018. 
Public records kept or stored on electronic 
computing equipment, 71 A.L.R.3d 232. 
Construction and effect of § 1-202 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code dealing with docu-
ments which are prima facie evidence of their 
own authenticity and genuineness, 72 A.L.R.3d 
1243. 
Authentication of bullets and other inorganic 
substances removed from human body for pur-
poses of analysis, 79 A.L.R.5th 237. 
Admissibility in evidence of aerial photo-
graphs, 85 A.L.R.5th 671. 
Rule 902. Self-authentication. 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
not required with respect to the following: 
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a seal 
purporting to be that of the United States, or of any state, district, common-
wealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or 
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the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political subdivision, 
department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an 
attestation or execution. 
(2) Domestic public document*: not under seal. A document purporting to 
bear the signature in the official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity 
included in Paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a public officer having a 
seal and having official duties in the district or political subdivision of the 
officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has the official capacity 
and that the signature [^ genuine. 
(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be executed or 
attested in an official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign 
country to make the execution or attestation, and accompanied by a final 
certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of 
the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate 
of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the execution or 
attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and 
official position relating to the execution or attestation. A final certification 
may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice 
consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular 
official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If 
reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the 
authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause 
shown, order tha t they be treated as presumptively authentic without final 
certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or 
without final certification. 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report or 
entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and 
actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any 
form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make 
the certification, by certificate complying with Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this 
rule or complying with any taw of the United States or of this state. 
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting 
to be issued by public authority. 
(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be news-
papers or periodicals. 
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels 
purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating 
ownership, control, or origin. 
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of 
acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or 
other officer authorized by lav/ to take acknowledgments. 
(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial paper, signatures 
thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general 
commercial law. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or 
identification provided by court rule, statute, or as provided in the constitution 
of this s tate . 
(11) Certified domestic records of regularly conducted activity. The original 
or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would 
be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by an affidavit or a written 
declaration of its custodian or other qualified person, certifying that: 
(A) the record was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters 
set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of 
those matters ; 
(B) the record was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; 
(C) the record was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular 
practice; and 
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(D) the person certifying the records does so under penalty of making a false 
statement in an official proceeding. 
The affidavit or declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, 
would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws where the 
declaration is signed. A party intending to offer a record into evidence under 
this paragraph must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse 
parties, and must make the record and certification available for inspection 
sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to challenge them. 
(12) Certified foreign records of regularly conducted activity. In a civil case, 
the original or a duplicate of a foreign record of regularly conducted activity 
that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by an affidavit or 
a written declaration by its custodian or other qualified person certifying that: 
(A) the record was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters 
set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of 
those matters; 
(B) the record was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; 
(C) the record was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular 
practice; and 
(D) the person certifying the records does so under penalty of making a false 
statement in an official proceeding. 
The affidavit or declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, 
would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws where the 
declaration is signed. A party intending to offer a record into evidence under 
this paragraph must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse 
parties, and must make the record and declaration available for inspection 
sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to challenge them. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2001.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision 
(1) is comparable to Rule 68, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule 68(3), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (10) is Rule 902(10), Uniform 
Rules of Evidence (1974). 
This subdivision [sic] does not supersede 
Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
defines the form of certification. 
The amendment to Rule 803(6) and the addi-
tion of Rules 902(11) and 902(12) were made to 
track the changes made to Federal Rule of 
Certified copies of public records. 
Foreign public documents. 
Certified copies of public records. 
Although a bench warrant was certified by 
the custodian of records of a county sheriff's 
office, the motion and order that referred to 
defendant's felony conviction were not certified 
by any official and were therefore not properly 
authenticated for admission under this rule. 
State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 
1996). 
Evidence 803(6) and the adoption of Federal 
Rules 902(11) and 902(12), effective December 
1,2000. The changes to the federal rules benefit 
from a federal statute allowing the use of dec-
larations without notarization. Utah has no 
comparable statute, so the requirements for 
declarations used under the rule are included 
within the rule itself. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-
ment added Subdivisions (11) and (12). 
Cross-References. — Proof of official 
record, U.R.C.P. 44. 
Foreign public documents. 
Copies of Colorado court records, certified by 
notary public who had no custody, official or 
unofficial, of the documents, were lacking suf-
ficient authentication to permit their receipt 
into evidence to establish that one charged with 
unlawful possession of dangerous weapon was 
on parole for felony. State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 
342 (Utah 1980). 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 





LAVAR T. JENSEN, 
Respondent. 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Civil No. < V m 0 2 t 3 7 C A 
Judge Fr^L G- ^ 0 J L V ~ 
This matter came for hearing on y/v\£^ D^^^rr , before the undersigned. The 
following parties were in attendance: _ 
^ S Petitioner S ^ Pfttitinnftr's attorney frtfwuyift Sager* 
X Respondent Q Respondent's attorney 
The Court having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and: 
having received argument and evidence, 
x^ having accepted the stipulation of the parties 
having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear 
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial 
each section that is included in this Order.) 
< 1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
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2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children and members of 
Petitioner's family or household: . 
3. The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, 
telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
4. The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from 
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at: 4924 South Holladay Blvd., 
Holladayf Utah 84117T and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with 
the utility services to the residence. 
5. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment, 
and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and 
the designated household and family members. These places are identified by the 
following addresses: NOYUS Services, 8475 South Sandy Parkway, Sandy, Utah; 272 
East 8000 South, Sandyf Utah (Petitioner's son): 4561 Dixie Ann Drive, West Valley 
City, Utah 84121 (Petitioner's sister); and, 6835 South Vista Grande Drive, 
Holladay, Utah (Petitioner's sister). 
6. The Court having found that Respondents use or possession of a weapon may pose 
a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, 
or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s): . 
7. The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile and/or 
other essential personal effects: . 
This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic 
proceedings. 
8. An officer from the following law enforcement agency: Salt Lake County Sheriff 
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner safely regains possession of the 
awarded property. 
9. An officer from the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's 
removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from the parties' residence. The 
law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent 
may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items. 
10. The Respondent is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this Order, 
the Department of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on Respondent 
and shall install monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in the residence 
of Respondent. Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of Corrections the costs 
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of the electronic monitoring required by this Order. The Department of Corrections shall 
have access to Petitioner's residence to install the appropriate monitoring equipment. 
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "1" THROUGH "10" MAY BE A CLASS 
A MISDEMEANOR. 
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through "1") which will 
(expire/be reviewed by the court) 150 days from the date of this order: 
a. The Petitioner is granted custody of the following minor children: 
b. Visitation shall be as follows: 
c. The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during 
visitation. 
d. The Respondent is restrained from removing the parties' minor child/ren from the 
state of Utah. 
e. The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount of 
$ pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
f. The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5. 
g. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren1 s day care 
expenses. 
h. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren fs medical 
expenses including premiums, deductibles and co-payments. 
I. The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount of 
$. 
j . The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a result 
of the abuse in the amount of $ . 
k. The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/ren1 s medical expenses, suffered 
as a result of the abuse in the amount of $ . 
1. Other: 
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Violation of provisions "a" through "1" may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings. 
11. The Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation 
into the allegation of child abuse. 
12. Other: 
jp* 13. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have Authority to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly 
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification 
of the Respondent is attached to the Appendix to this Order. 
4i 
14. Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that 
[ave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of 
Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories. 
15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the 
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the 
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made 
available to Respondent. 
DATED: 
BY THE COURT: 
O-HTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY 
OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON Fl 
IN THE THfflD DISTRICT COURT S" 
LAKE COUNlTY STATE QIj UT) 
DATE- 2E 
lTf 
DEPUTY COUrtT CLERK 
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Recommended by: 
^ i^Ay / Skh i°Fi 
'• District t^aurt/Commissioner Date 
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service, 
of this Protective Order and waives the right to be personally served. 
IZi U7f f * , / ^ M ^ i A 
Respondent 
Serve Respondent at: 
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